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ABSTRACT 
 
For nearly two decades, international organisations and bilateral donors agencies have been 
involved in the promotion and implementation of legal and judicial reform projects in developing 
and transition countries. This paper refers to this process as the rule of law enterprise (RLE). It 
identifies the ambiguities and misconceptions of the RLE and asks why there has been so little 
interaction between those involved in the implementation of legal and judicial reform and 
academics with knowledge and experience on this topic. After identifying the theoretical and 
practical obstacles to a fruitful dialogue the paper concludes that such a dialogue could take 
place, provided that academics – political scientists and lawyers – and practitioners adjust their 
respective approaches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years the World Bank and regional development banks (Asian Development 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), along with bilateral donor agencies and international agencies such as the European 
Union and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have become involved in the 
promotion and implementation of legal and judicial reform projects in developing and transition 
countries. This paper refers to this process as the rule of law enterprise (RLE) and refers generally 
to its promoters as international financial institutions (IFIs). 
 
Today the RLE occupies a prominent place on the development agenda. The IFIs regard the 
rule of law as indispensable for achieving good government and ensuring the protection of 
international human rights. Initially, some governments in developing countries were reluctant to 
embrace it. However, their attitude has changed. Tough conditionalities attached to international 
loans and generous bilateral aid packages soon persuaded them that improvements in the rule of 
law were indeed a top development priority. Moreover, as the framework of international 
economic regulation matured, governments became increasingly aware that, unless they adapted 
their legal systems to the demands of globalization, their position within the world economy 
would deteriorate. As a consequence, today virtually every government in developing and 
transition countries is involved in one or more internationally sponsored projects designed to 
strengthen their legal systems and institutions. Participation in rule of law projects, especially 
those designed to combat political corruption, gives governments a much-coveted aura of 
respectability among international agencies and bilateral donors.  
 
The prominence of rule of law projects is a new departure in the area of development 
cooperation. Until recently the World Bank, as well as other multila teral banks, had no interest in it. 
They regarded the rule of law either as an unproblematic technical tool that could be safely ignored 
or as a controversial political artefact that should be kept away from contaminating development 
projects. Today, however, they regard law as a magic wand that promises to resolve virtually every 
conceivable economic and social problem. Despite the prominent place that law plays in current 
development thinking, legal academics and political scientists with knowledge of and experience in 
developing countries have played virtually no role in the RLE. Instead, the RLE appears to have 
been intellectually nurtured almost exclusively by economists of a neo-liberal persuasion. The 
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exclusion from the RLE of legal academics is not altogether surprising. After all legal, academics with 
expertise in development are often hostile towards market-based approaches, are generally 
excessively critical, rarely agree with each other and their work is often plagued by incomprehensible 
jargon. The exclusion of experts on political development is not surprising either, since, until recently, 
these scholars did not regard law as having any relevance to the development process.  
 
There is, of course, no shortage of legal and political commentary on the RLE. Yet, this 
literature is either excessively negative or, if constructive somewhat narrow. Radical critics regard 
the RLE as part of a wider scheme associated with the much-maligned policies of structural 
adjustment and the so-called Washington consensus (Fitzpatrick 2001: 212-215, Santos 2002: 
335-352, Tshuma 2000). There is truth in this view. The process of economic globalization 
undoubtedly provided the impulse for the RLE and the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have played a major role in steering this process. This critique, however, is largely negative, as 
it offers no clear indication as to how law and legal institutions can be made to contribute to social 
and economic development. Absent from this critique is any attempt to reflect on the practical 
lessons that emerge from the implementation of the RLE. Observers with a practical interest in the 
RLE have produced useful studies and commentaries. So far, however, their work has either been 
partial and incomplete (Carrothers 2003, Chodosh 2002, Dezalay and Garth 2002, Faundez 1997, 
Faundez 2001, Garth 2002, Golub 2003, Hammergren 2002, Jensen 2003, Upham 2002, Nagle 
2000) or not critical enough (Biebesheimer and Payne 2001, Dakolias 1995).  
 
A dialogue between RLE practitioners and academics with experience in development is 
urgently needed. Despite its many shortcomings, the RLE is an attempt to respond to 
developments associated with the process of economic globalization, the spread of democracy 
and the enhanced authority of international human rights. As such, the RLE is part of a larger 
process that is redefining the relationship between states and citizens, the nature and function of 
governments and the pattern of integration of states within regional and global institutions. Since 
we all have a stake in this process, the RLE ought to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, there is 
little evidence that a dialogue between RLE practitioners and academics with expertise in 
developing countries is forthcoming. Moreover, because RLE practitioners and its academic 
critics refuse fully to confront the political implications of legal and judicial reform, it is unlikely 
that a dialogue, were it to take place, would yield a fruitful outcome. Indeed, as this paper 
argues, both RLE practitioners and its academic counterparts are trapped in a conceptual 
framework that blurs their understanding of law and social change. The objective of this paper is 
thus to identify the obstacles to a dialogue and to suggest how such a dialogue could be 
promoted. The first section briefly traces the evolution of the RLE, identifies some its major 
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problems and explains why RLE practitioners are reluctant to engage in a dialogue with 
academics. The second section examines the response of academic lawyers and political 
scientists to legal and judicial reform and argues that, on the whole, they have little to offer as 
neither their approach nor their methodology significantly departs from that employed by RLE 
practitioners. But the prospects of a fruitful dialogue are not altogether bleak, as evidenced by 
the recent work of Guillermo O’Donnell, a leading specialist in political development and Latin 
American politics. Thus, the third section of this paper critically examines O’Donnell’s views on 
the rule of law and democracy and concludes that, despite some problems, they provide a useful 
starting point for initiating a fruitful dialogue between RLE practitioners and academics with 
experience in political development.      
                I 
RLE: AMBIGUITIES AND MISCONCEPTIONS 
Incessant Growth 
During its relatively short life, the RLE has undergone an astonishing transformation. Initially, 
the World Bank was concerned with the drafting of laws in economic and commercial law areas and 
with the reform of courts. It was conceived as a technical enterprise that could be implemented 
without paying close attention to underlying political and economic factors. The reform process 
concentrated mainly on improving efficiency by updating and modernising the infrastructure of 
courts, introducing modern systems of case management and court administration and providing 
training for judges and court personnel.  
 
It soon became obvious that this approach had serious shortcomings. As attempts to reform 
courts presupposed that courts were independent, RLE practitioners had to look beyond the 
judicial context to issues of constitutional engineering and institutions generally. The wider focus 
on institutions led to the introduction of the notion of governance. A perusal of the World 
Development Report, published annually by the World Bank, shows that between 1997 and 
2002/3 the number of items identified as important components of governance has grown at a 
rapid pace. Thus, while in 1997 the WDR identified 45 items relevant to ‘good governance’, in  
1999 the number of items had increased to 66 and in 2002/3 to 116 (Grindle 2002). Since 
virtually every aspect of governance has a legal dimension, the expansion of the governance 
agenda brought about a corresponding expansion of the RLE agenda. Thus, today the scope of 
the RLE agenda is as broad – and vague - as the governance agenda. Indeed, it is difficult to 
think of a legal topic excluded from the RLE. While the work of the World Bank continues to 
revolve largely around judicial reform, other international organizations and bilateral donors have 
ventured into areas such as criminal law, access to justice, policing, administrative law and 
informal justice systems (UNDP 1997).  
 
The expansion of the agenda of the RLE has not, however, improved the quality of the 
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delivery of their projects, nor has it made life easier for practitioners involved in the design, 
implementation and delivery of these projects. The ever-expanding agenda of the RLE raises 
innumerable practical problems. Where should the reform process start? How should priorities be 
identified? What is the correct sequencing of policies in the reform process? What should be the 
balance between loans and technical assistance? Should all projects aim at ‘comprehensive’ reform 
or should the objectives of the reform process be more limited? These are difficult questions, and, in 
order properly to address them, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the strategy 
underlying the RLE. Questions about strategy, however, are the Achilles’ heel of the RLE.  
 
The Strategy 
Initially, the strategic objectives of the RLE were clear.  As set out in some of the key World 
Bank documents, the RLE was designed to establish legal frameworks friendly to market reforms 
(World Bank 1992, World Bank 1995). Accordingly, the formula proposed was simple: general 
laws that were properly drafted and fairly enforced would yield instant economic benefits. The 
simplicity of this formula is perhaps the reason why, in the early days of the RLE, its practitioners 
saw no need to enter into a dialogue with academics with experience of legal reform in developing 
countries. Moreover the simplicity of the proposed formula also led to unrealistic expectations and 
to intense optimism that observers with experience in developing countries probably regarded as 
both arrogant and naïve.  
 
The continuous expansion of the RLE prompted senior World Bank officials to re-consider 
its strategy. As part of this process, the Bank organised a major international conference in 
Washington in 2000 (Van Puymbroeck 2001). The aim was to open up a dialogue with academics, 
politicians and representatives of NGOs to take stock of the lessons learned during the preceding 
decade and to consider the possibility of formulating a strategy more suited to the expanded RLE 
agenda. The much-awaited strategy did not, however, materialise. Instead, the Bank issued a 
document that largely restates the old ‘market friendly’ approach (World Bank 2003). Thus, 
although the RLE has expanded beyond recognition, its conceptual foundations have remained the 
same. It is debatable whether the narrow conceptual framework of the RLE will be capable of 
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containing its large and ever-expanding agenda.  
 
Muddling Through  
It is unlikely that practitioners will lose sleep over the tension identified above between the 
RLE’s conceptual framework and its broad agenda. Yet, whether or not they are interested in 
theory, the expansion of the RLE is creating unexpected problems. Indeed, officials involved in 
designing and implementing RLE projects are becoming increasingly aware that there are no 
‘quick fixes’ in the area of legal and judicial reform (Hammergren 2003). Moreover, recipient 
countries also have mixed feelings about the enterprise. Some complain that the agencies are far 
too intrusive and prescriptive, while others (often the same officials) claim that international 
agencies do not offer adequate technical support (Angell and Faundez 2005). Promoters of the 
RLE enterprise have responded by making small adjustment to their projects, but, so far, they 
have not significantly changed their approach or revised their methodology.   
 
Given the sudden expansion of the RLE, it is not surprising that officials responsible for the 
implementation of these programmes find the process difficult and frustrating. They soon become 
aware that legal systems do not exist in isolation and realise that tinkering with one of its components 
brings about unexpected responses and resistance from other parts of the system. They also soon 
realise that legal systems are part of wider mechanisms of political and economic domination, and, 
that vested interests cannot be ignored or wished away. These are mammoth problems. Officials in 
the operations departments of international organizations, bilateral donor agencies and NGOs cannot 
be expected to resolve them. Under these conditions, the patience and dedication of these officials, 
as well as their often-excellent achievements, are remarkable (Biebesheimer and Payne 2001).  
   
In practical terms, the response to the problems identified above has been to press ahead in 
the hope that practice and experience will yield the right answer. This pragmatic response has the 
advantage that it is seemingly flexible. Indeed, in recent years, RLE practitioners have become 
increasingly willing publicly to admit that not all is well with legal and judicial reform. Thus the phrase 
‘lessons learned’ is often found in official publications on the RLE (World Bank 2004: 12-14). But 
what is described as lessons learned is so general that it is unclear whether this acknowledgement 
can make any difference.  Thus, among the lessons that supposedly have been learned are the 
following: that the process of legal and institutional reform is slow and that one size does not fit all.  
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It is difficult to believe that Bank officials were not aware, prior to launching the RLE, that 
there are no quick fixes in the area of institutional reform. It is also difficult to believe that promoters 
of the RLE genuinely believed that one size fits all. It must be conceded, however, that the current 
response that perhaps one size does not fit all is attractive as it suggests that RLE practitioners are 
indeed learning lessons and that, in future, legal and judicial reform projects will be carefully tailored 
to fit the needs of recipient countries. There is, however, little evidence that those in charge of the 
design and implementation of rule of law projects have been given the time and resources to do so. 
In any event, the problem is not whether one size fits all. Indeed, in some areas of legal practice, it 
could well be that one size does fit a variety of different contexts. The process of legal 
harmonisation, which under the aegis of globalization has acquired new impetus, is pervasive. Thus, 
in areas such as environmental regulation, competition policy or central banking, it does seem that 
one size fits all. Moreover, the growth of the human rights movement has extended the process of 
harmonization to areas of the law that are not directly related to the management of the economy. 
Thus, the issue is not whether one size fits all, but about understanding the impact of institutional and 
legal reform on legal and political systems. Unless this impact is adequately considered, the phrase 
‘lessons learned’ is simply another way of saying ‘we will muddle through’ and hope for the best. 
This approach undoubtedly has some appeal among common law lawyers (Feeley and Rubin 1998). 
I wonder, however, how governments would respond if they became aware that RLE projects, 
some of which they purchase at considerable expense, are not technically safe or reliable.  
 
The Vanishing Development Objective 
While RLE practitioners muddle through in the expectation that experience will help them 
find answers to the problems of implementation, the strategic question as to why they are involved in 
legal and institutional reform does not go away. This question is not raised by the anti globalization 
movement, but by mainstream economists, multilateral bank evaluation offices and government 
agencies. While in this area it is difficult to disentangle genuine intellectual and policy disagreements 
from bureaucratic turf wars, there is, undoubtedly, a current of opinion within multilateral 
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development banks that is beginning to question whether the RLE has any bearing on concrete 
development objectives (Meltzer Commission Report 2000, United States General Accounting 
Office 2001, World Bank 2002, Lerrick 2002). Accordingly, economists at some of these 
institutions are beginning to demand hard evidence that improvements in the legal system have a 
measurable impact on the process of economic growth. Since the evidence is not forthcoming, the 
tension between development economists and RLE practitioners is not likely to subside (Messick 
1999).   
 
It is ironic that some economists are now beginning to express frustration and 
disenchantment with the RLE. After all, the launching pad of the RLE was an economic theory that 
proclaimed the centrality of the market in social relations and called for a shift from old -fashioned 
development projects (dams, bridges and roads) to institutional infrastructure (law and good 
governance). Perhaps the concern of development economists reflects a deeper anxiety about the 
state of the sub-field of development economics (Ranis 2004). Apart from the pressure from 
economists, leading experts on law and economics also view the RLE with a certain amount of 
scepticism. Thus, for example, Richard Posner – one of the main exponents of the law and 
economic movement - has questioned whether comprehensive legal reform is necessary to bring 
about efficient economic outcomes (Posner 1998). Other academic observers have also expressed 
scepticism as to whether improvements in the law will necessarily yield better economic outcomes 
(Davis and Trebilcock 2001, Cross 2002). The various Asian economic miracles (tigers and 
dragons) are a reminder that perhaps the RLE, as presently conceived and implemented, is not likely 
to achieve either improved economic outcomes or improvements in the quality of governance (Pistor 
and Wellons 1999).  
 
RLE practitioners can, of course, respond to this criticism. They can point out that their 
projects are relevant to economic development because law pervades every aspect of social life. 
But such a response merely underscores the ambiguity of the RLE.  
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Regime Change or Tinkering  
As RLE practitioners continue to ‘muddle through’, external observers have good reasons 
to be puzzled. Indeed, from an external perspective, the RLE appears to oscillate between the 
seemingly innocuous goal of improving the physical and technological infrastructure of courts and the 
more ambitious task of carrying out a complete overhaul of legal systems – a task that comes 
dangerously close to the controversial notion of regime change (Faundez 2003). If the RLE merely 
seeks improvement in the design and delivery of legal services - such as, for example, simplifying tax 
laws, updating regulatory frameworks or improving the management of courts – it may be regarded 
as a technical operation that can be safely entrusted to lawyers and public administration specialists. 
If, on the other hand, the RLE seeks a more profound transformation of legal systems – as was the 
case in some of the former socialist countries and in developing countries affected by civil strife (East 
Timor, Rwanda, Guatemala) - then the technical aspects of law recede as political factors relating to 
regimes and constitutional arrangements acquire greater prominence.  
 
Perhaps promoters of the RLE believe that, by using the word ‘governance’, they can 
circumvent the ambiguity noted above. The choice of the word, governance, however, is odd 
since its meaning is imprecise. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines governance, as “the act 
or manner of governing”. So the word governance is helpful precisely because it is ambiguous. It 
helps to raise the profile of modest projects of legal reform while it conceals the complexity and 
intrusiveness of projects that seek more profound legal change. Since all RLE projects can be 
described as projects seeking ‘improvements in governance’ they all acquire a technical aura 
that is often not justified. 
 
The political nature of much of the activity that falls under the umbrella of the RLE cannot, 
however, be easily ignored. The use of the word governance to describe these activities does 
not have the expected sanitising effects, nor does it remove the complexity, or the political 
implications, of many aspects of the process of legal and political reform. Moreover, as anyone 
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familiar with law knows, even innocuous changes to the legal system often have unanticipated 
social and political consequences.  
 
A Methodological Shortcut 
RLE practitioners, undoubtedly, are fully aware of the political implications of their activities. 
Yet, there are legal reasons that explain their reluctance to confront them. The old international 
financial institutions (World Bank and IMF), as well as the United Nations, are constrained by their 
charters from venturing into political areas. The post-war settlement that left the world divided into 
two opposing camps brought about respect for state sovereignty and, as a corollary, the prohibition 
to intervene in the internal affairs of states. While the principle of non-intervention was not widely 
respected, it did influence the way international economic organizations defined their mission. In 
order to reassure its members that involvement in matters concerning economic development was 
not political, the constitutional charters of the World Bank and its affiliates defined their mission as 
purely technical. Accordingly, concerns about law and legal institutions did not fall within the scope 
of their jurisdiction. This constitutional constraint explains why the World Bank has been unwilling to 
update its RLE strategy. If the new strategy were faithfully to reflect the whole gamut of activities 
that currently fall within the RLE, it would inevitably be dismissed on the ground that it is not ‘market 
friendly’. It would also be challenged as inconsistent with the Bank’s mission of promoting economic 
development.   
 
This constraint has influenced the way RLE practitioners approach their work. They see it as 
primarily technical and exclusively legal. In terms of legal theory, I would characterise their response 
as a curious blend of legal formalism and legal instrumentalism. While legal formalism reassures RLE 
practitioners that legal systems are self-contained and can be changed without the contamination of 
politics; legal instrumentalism reassures them that once formal law is in place well trained judges and 
dynamic commercial lawyers will move the legal edifice in the right direction. Although this response 
is misguided, I fully understand why RLE practitioners embrace it. After all, officials working for IFIs 
have a job to do, and the tools in the lawyers’ kit promise to deliver the desired results. These tools, 
however, are virtually all drawn from rules and legal institutions found in the legal systems of OECD 
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countries, especially the USA.  In practice, however, their misguided belief in the virtues of legal 
formalism and in the capacity of lawyers and judges to bring about social change has transformed 
the imported rules and institutions into universal benchmarks. The blend of legal formalism and 
instrumentalism is a convenient methodological shortcut as it enables RLE practitioners to offer legal 
advice without having to go through the tedious, difficult and often unrewarding task of 
understanding the societies they purport to help. The World Bank, bilateral donors and even some 
NGOs working in the area of human rights welcome this methodological shortcut as it ensures the 
delivery of legal products that are standardised and familiar. In this way, ‘due process’, ‘judicial 
review’ and ‘constitutionalism’ acquire an aura that detaches them from their historical origins and 
transforms them into moral and political imperatives that are used to measure and evaluate the 
quality of governance and the efficiency of legal systems. Insofar as RLE practitioners continue to 
regard law as a merely technical artefact they have little to gain from entering into a dialogue with 
academics. Such a dialogue will either yield technical legal information they already know or raise 
political issues that they would rather avoid. Under these circumstances, a fruitful dialogue between 
RLE practitioners and academics is highly unlikely.  
  
  
       II 
               LAW AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT  
Fear of Politics  
Development agencies are not alone in their reluctance to confront the political implications 
of RLE. Academic lawyers with interest in the area of development have the same aversion towards 
politics. Indeed, fear of politics was one of the factors that brought about the demise of the US-
based law and development movement of the 1960s and early 1970s (Gardner 1980). Inspired by 
the success of the civil rights movement in the United States, the distinguished academics who 
launched the law and development movement set out to improve the efficiency of legal systems in 
developing countries, in particular the mechanisms that facilitate the exercise of rights. Their 
expectation was that a modern and effective legal system would bring about political benefits and 
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greater social justice to the worst-off sections of the population. But law and development 
practitioners soon discovered that in the political and social terrain of countries as diverse as Brazil, 
Ghana, Colombia and Sri Lanka, legal reform would either be futile or, worse, would contribute 
towards consolidating and deepening the privileges of the ruling elites. Since law and development 
practitioners were unwilling to transform themselves into political scientists, they declared that the 
movement was terminally ill (Trubek and Galanter 1974, Trubek 2003, Merryman 1977). Its death 
was confirmed when funds from the US-Government dried up and prominent American foundations 
turned their attention to other urgent issues.  
 
It is interesting to note, that while members of the law and development movement were 
expressing unease with the political dimension of legal change, more theoretically minded colleagues 
within their educational establishments were beginning to develop a critique of liberal legalism. This 
group eventually established the critical legal studies movement. Their work, though inspired by 
Roberto Unger’s devastating critique of liberalism, concentrated almost exclusively on debunking the 
myths of the process of adjudication (Unger 1983). Their critique of adjudication naturally went 
hand in hand with a critique of rights. Their analysis led them to conclude that the promise of 
certainty and predictability implicit in liberal legalism was hollow. Law, seen largely as the outcome 
of the process of adjudication, was characterised as essentially indeterminate. ‘Law is politics’ is the 
phrase that - perhaps with some exaggeration - identifies the message underlying the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement (McCormick 1999).  
 
Members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement did not have the intellectual inhibitions that 
characterised the law and development movement. Instead of scouting around for help from 
other disciplines, they developed their own theoretical position (Kennedy 1997). Yet, both the 
law and development movement and critical legal theorists share the same fear and distrust of 
politics. The law and development movement abandoned the field because they could not find a 
theory that offered a clear explanation about the link between legal and political processes. 
Critical legal theorists, for their part, ‘trashed’ liberal legalism because they regarded the process 
of adjudication as political, or as an area in which reason is displaced by arbitrary choice. Either 
way, they both reflect the deep-seated fear and scepticism that academic lawyers feel towards 
politics and political analysis.  
 
Bringing Political Scientists Back In  
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If practitioners and academic lawyers are reluctant to explore the political implications of the 
RLE, it is only natural to seek enlightenment from political scientists. But this is not an area 
where most political scientists have expertise. Indeed, until recently, political scientists had no 
interest in law and legal institutions. Their focus of analysis was mainly on the political behaviour 
of groups and individuals, and they regarded the study of institutions as unscientific on the 
ground that it was either purely descriptive or excessively normative. As a consequence, the 
study of constitutionalism or the rule of law did not fall within their brief.  
 
The disregard for law and legal institutions was also reflected in the approach of political 
scientists and economists working in the area of development studies. The development 
paradigm that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s was based on the assumption that 
economic growth followed a pre-determined route, and each stage along the way was 
associated with a specific level of institutional development (Rostow 1960). This stage-by-stage 
approach to economic growth was complemented by Lipset’s celebrated theory on the 
prerequisites of democracy (Lipset 1959). According to this theory, most developing countries 
were unlikely in the near future to meet the requirements of a democratic polity – understood as 
liberal democracy. Since the rule of law is regarded as a distinctive feature of advanced liberal 
democracies, it is not surprising that law and legal institutions were of no concern to scholars 
working in the field of political development. Indeed, their concern was mainly with stability and 
the containment of political mobilisation (Bermeo 1997). Thus, specialists in political 
development would not have favoured the extension of rights to subordinate groups, as this 
would have been seen as a threat to political stability (Huntington 1968, Huntington and Nelson 
1976).  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the recent wave of democratization brought about 
renewed interest in the study of institutions. Scholars specialising in the study of democratic 
transitions could not fail to notice that law and legal institutions played a role in the establishment and 
consolidation of democratic regimes. They have thus begun to turn their attention towards RLE 
topics such as judicial independence, constitutionalism, systems of legal accountability and access to 
justice. This shift of focus by political scientists has generated substantial research output, some of 
which is extremely useful and insightful (Bill Chavez 2004, Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003). 
On the whole, however, there is little evidence of a theoretical breakthrough. According to 
Guillermo O’Donnell, there are two reasons that explain the difficulties political scientist face when 
they attempt to engage with issues relating to the RLE. First, political scientists are not trained to 
observe the highly disaggregated qualitative data generated by the study of institutions. And 
secondly, political scientists do not have the required legal knowledge to understand how institutions 
work. O’Donnell is not optimistic about the prospects for overcoming these obstacles. In his view, 
“[I]n settings where career and promotion patterns place a prize on working on mainstream topics 
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and approaches, the transdisciplinary skills required by these phenomena and, at least for the time 
being, the difficulties in translating findings into solid and comparable data sets are a discouraging 
factor for this type of research” (O’Donnell 1999, 333-4). Perhaps this assessment is too bleak, but 
it does suggest that bringing political scientists into the RLE will not instantly resolve the ambiguities 
and misconceptions that have plagued this process from its inception nearly two decades ago.  
  
There are, however, reasons, to be sceptic. The recent wave of democratization appears to 
be having a negative, unintended, effect on the study of politics in developing countries. This effect 
appears to stem from an interesting process of theoretical and methodological convergence: political 
scientists who study democracy in developing countries are using the same theories and methods of 
colleagues studying similar processes in well-established democracies. This convergence, prompted 
and nurtured by the pervasive influence of neoclassical economics on all the social sciences, has 
brought about a decline in area studies since specialisation in one region of the world, or a small 
group of countries, is no longer seen as cost effective. As Barbara Geddes in her excellent survey of 
the sub-field explains, scholars who concentrate exclusively in one area are hindered in theory testing 
because they know nothing, or very little, about countries in other regions (Geddes 2002). 
Conversely, it is now possible to become an expert on democratization in developing countries 
without having specialist knowledge of their history or political institutions. 
  
The theoretical and methodological convergence noted by Geddes in the study of 
democratic processes is also evident in studies by political scientists on topics that relate to the RLE. 
Indeed, many of these scholars approach the study of legal systems in developing countries as if it 
were no different from that in developed countries. They thus tend to regard legal institutions in 
developed countries as models of best practice that have to be emulated by developing countries. 
As a consequence, these studies sidestep the complexity of the role of law in political processes and 
end up replicating the formalistic and instrumental approach of RLE practitioners. Absent from these 
studies is any concern about whether all or even any of the legal institutions they urge new 
democracies to embrace are appropriate. Thus, for example, a recent study on the impediments to 
judicial reform in Latin America opens up with the following statement: 
 
The rule of law is necessary for the political stabilization of liberal 
 16 
democracy. Only through the establishment of an enforceable, binding and 
predictable rule of law can countries in Latin America adopt the political 
rules required for the development of a strong competitive democracy. An 
independent judiciary is one of the core institutions necessary for the 
principle of separation of powers…Typically, judiciaries in Latin America 
are weak, over-politicised and heavily dependent on and subordinate to 
the executive branch. They often fail to act as effective mechanisms of 
political checks and controls (Buscaglia and Domingo 1997). 
 
.  
The authors of this study then go on to show how Latin American judiciaries and legal systems fail to 
meet the requirements prescribed at the outset. Although academically interesting, it is doubtful 
whether such a study significantly enhances our intellectual and practical understanding of judiciaries. 
While the study is excellent in that it identifies the shortcomings of judiciaries in regard to 
international benchmarks, it does not ask why this is so. Indeed, the state of Latin American 
judiciaries, as depicted by the authors, is so calamitous that it would seem that any attempt at reform 
would be futile.  
 
  
  
 III 
        A DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW 
Rediscovering Law  
It is disappointing that political scientists who have embarked on the study of legal and judicial 
reform fail to reflect upon the wider theoretical implications of their work. A notable exception 
to this trend is Guillermo O’Donnell. After writing extensively on transitions to democracy, he 
has turned his attention to issues relating to the rule of law. Although his views on this topic are 
tentative, they are worth considering as they raise important issues that his colleagues have 
overlooked. In the interest of brevity I shall focus mainly on the argument that O’Donnell 
presents in two recent publications, “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A 
Partial Conclusion”(O’Donnell 1999, hereafter Polyarchies) and “Why the Rule of Law 
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Matters”(O’Donnell 2004, hereafter Rule of Law).  I will not consider his wider ideas about 
politics and economics, nor will I consider his valuable contribution to the study of democratic 
transitions. As a consequence, what follows is incomplete schematic and provisional. I trust, 
however, that it fairly represents his views on this topic.  
 
The question that concerns O’Donnell is as difficult as it is important. It relates to the tension 
between political equality and the pervasive social and economic inequalities that prevail in most 
developing countries. How, asks O’Donnell, can new democracies in Latin America and other 
developing countries escape the destabilising effects of this tension? His answer is disarmingly 
simple: the new democratic regimes must take seriously the rule of law.  
 
The suggestion that new democracies should take the rule of law seriously is, on the surface, 
persuasive. Indeed, the legal system and legal institutions of most developing countries are often 
weak and corrupt. Latin American countries, for example, have perfectly drafted constitutions 
and comprehensive legal codes that are technically adequate and cover virtually every 
conceivable eventuality. But since many do not fully, or fairly, enforce their constitutions or legal 
codes, the argument that law ought to be taken seriously seems compelling. Yet, the force of this 
argument depends on whether its premise is valid: that until now law in Latin America has been a 
decorative device devoid of social and economic content.  
 
A close scrutiny of the evolution of legal and political systems in Latin America suggests that law 
has been a lot more than a decorative artefact While many of the rights enshrined in the 
constitution or legal codes are not enforced or applied fairly to all citizens, they are not dead 
letter or a mere formality. Legal rules define who participates in the political process, justify and 
legitimise the treatment of workers and, most importantly, provide a predictable framework to 
structure commercial transactions both locally and internationally. Legal systems play a crucial 
role in shaping social and political processes. The rules of the legal system, however, are not 
always universally and fairly applied. The law may be fair to members of the political and 
commercial elites, but tough and unforgiving towards those excluded from this circle. Legal 
systems, though imperfect, are not empty vessels detached from politics waiting to be filled with 
content. This analysis also applies to legal systems in other regions (Channock 1989, Dev 1965, 
Mamdani 1990).  
 
O’Donnell is, of course, aware of the many shortcomings of legal systems in developing 
countries and regards these shortcomings as an impediment to the progress of democracy. His 
assessment of the performance of the new democracies in Latin America is gloomy and depressingly 
familiar (Polyarchies 312-313). In most of these countries the state bureaucracy does not respect 
the citizens, discrimination against women and minorities is rampant, ordinary people do not have 
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access to the judiciary and general lawlessness, especially in large cities, is the norm. This bleak 
diagnosis suggests that the unstable social and economic conditions prevailing in Latin American 
threatens to undermine democracy, thus raising the possibility of a return to populism or 
authoritarianism. According to O’Donnell, this outcome can be avoided if countries observe the rule 
of law. His suggestion is a major departure from the approach taken by political development 
specialists of the 1960s and early 1970s. Instead of regarding the rule of law as the outcome of 
successful policies of economic development, O’Donnell sees the rule of law as the means to 
sustaining democratic regimes and resolving social and economic inequalities.  
 
Reviving Legal Formalism  
O’Donnell’s notion of the rule of law is based on a list of formal attributes identified by Joseph 
Raz in an article appropriately entitled ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (Raz 1977). Raz 
identifies eight attributes associated with the rule of law: laws must be prospective, stable and 
general; the judiciary must be independent, principles of natural justice (due process) must be 
observed, courts should have review powers, they should be easily accessible and prosecutors 
should not have excessive discretion. Raz’s list is not original and he does not present it as such. 
Most legal theorists would have no difficulties embracing it. Yet, I suspect that scholars who, 
from different perspectives, have studied the role of law in society would regard O’Donnell’s 
embrace of this formalistic conception of the rule of law as somewhat disappointing. After all, 
the shortcomings of purely formal approaches to the study of law have been amply 
demonstrated in the work of scholars from widely different perspectives, including social 
theorists (Habermas 1996, Unger 1976), historians (Benton 2002, Tilly 1998), legal 
anthropologists (Geertz 1983, Mamdani 1996, Merry 2000, Nader 1990) and legal academics 
(Chanock 1985, Trubek 1972). The work of this diverse group of scholars shows that law is 
deeply embedded in social practices and that formalistic conceptions of the rule of law are not 
reliable guides to understanding the relationship between legal and political processes.  
 
O’Donnell does not, of course, believe that compliance with the rule of law will instantly 
stabilise democracy and contribute towards resolving the tension between political equality and 
socio-economic inequality. Indeed, he acknowledges that rule by law (or mere legalism) often leads 
to deepen the tension identified above. Instead, what he suggests is that the rule of law is an 
indispensable component of democracy and, as such, what he proposes is not revival of formalism 
but greater awareness that democracy and the rule of law are complementary. Thus, the virtues 
attached to the rule of law are also virtues of the democratic process. He thus calls for the 
establishment of a genuinely democratic rule of law. According to him, a democratic rule of law has 
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three characteristics: “1) It upholds the political rights, freedoms and guarantees of a democratic 
regime; 2) it upholds the civil rights of the whole population; and 3) it establishes networks of 
responsibility and accountability which entail that all public and private agents, including the highest 
state officials, are subject to appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their acts” 
(Rule of Law 36).  
 
The notion of a democratic rule of law is more overtly political than Raz’s list of rule of law 
virtues, yet it is still formalistic. Indeed, it does not go beyond the traditional notion of 
constitutionalism as limited government (Sartori 1962). As such, it does not tell us how law can 
provide a platform to bring about both a reduction of socio-economic inequalities and a 
strengthening of political democracy. In order to understand O’Donnell’s faith in the rule of law, 
it is necessary to bear in mind that he makes an important distinction between the nature of a 
country’s political regime and the nature of its state. A democratic political regime (one where 
public authorities are selected by free and competitive elections) may obtain within a state that is 
far from democratic. This is indeed his complaint about the state of democracy in most Latin 
American countries today. He is thus critical of political scientists who focus exclusively on the 
nature of political regimes to determine whether a country is democratic. He correctly points out 
that, in order to determine whether a state is democratic, it is necessary to look closely at the 
way the legal system works. The legal system, according to O’Donnell, is an intermediate level 
that stands between the political regime and the socio-economic foundations of state and 
society. Understanding how this intermediate level works is also important because, according 
to O’Donnell, legal systems and institutions have a major impact upon the way traditional 
political institutions, such as parties, parliaments and congresses, work or fail to work 
(Polyarchy 315). But understanding the nature and impact of legal systems is not only of 
academic interest. It has practical importance because compliance with its precepts can bridge 
the gap between political equality and socio-economic inequality, thus contributing towards 
consolidating the quality of democracy.  
 
O’Donnell thus calls upon political scientists to examine closely the way legal systems work 
and proposes a research agenda that is as comprehensive as that advocated by RLE practitioners. 
The research agenda is designed to answer questions that for many years have plagued lawyers and 
academics who study the role of law and society. Here follows a sample: Does the legal system 
extend homogeneously across the territory of the state? Does it apply uniformly across social 
classes? Does it contain effective mechanisms of accountability? Does it dispense justice fairly and 
with equal consideration and respect? Do the poor have effective access to justice? (Rule of Law 
44.) 
 
If political scientists and other social scientists were seriously to carry out O’Donnell’s 
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research agenda, they would greatly contribute to enlightening RLE practitioners. Yet, however 
valuable O’Donnell’s research agenda may be, it does not tell us how compliance with the rule of 
law can achieve the social and economic transformations required to strengthen and enhance the 
quality of democracy.  
 
Rights and Political Regimes  
O’Donnell’s confidence in the rule of law stems from his conception about rights. He notes that 
in old democracies or as he calls them elsewhere, “the originating countries” (O’Donnell 2001), 
political rights were extended to citizens only after civil rights had been extensively recognised. 
Moreover, in those same countries, the recognition of social rights occurred at a much later 
stage (Polyarchies 309). By contrast, today, new democracies in developing countries recognise 
the political equality of citizens, even though civil and social rights are not widely respected. But 
these democracies do, however, formally recognise that civil rights of a universal character 
attach to individuals irrespective of their social position. According to O’Donnell these formal 
rights ought not to be lightly dismissed since “when conquered and exercised, they provide a 
valuable foundation for struggling for more specific and substantive rights” (Polyarchies, 323). 
He underscores the political importance of the rights of legal subject by pointing out that the 
close relationship between legal rights and the political rights of citizens: “the formal rights and 
obligations attached by polyarchy to political citizenship are a subset of the rights and obligations 
attached to a legal person” (Polyarchies, 308). By this he means that the exercise of political 
rights by citizens presupposes that they already enjoy rights such as the right of association and 
free speech, which are also civil rights. He thus refers to the rights enjoyed by members of these 
new polyarchies as rights of civil citizenship.  
 
O’Donnell’s argument about the intimate relationship between political and civil rights is 
important, but, unfortunately, somewhat nebulous. It would have been helpful had he expanded his 
theoretical and historical analysis on this point. In any event, there is little doubt that O’Donnell, 
while acknowledging the importance of formal rights, does not regard rights as empty shells. He 
regards rights as the product of social and political struggles. Law, under his conception, is not a 
mere technique for ordering social relations, but “a dynamic condensation of power relations” 
(Polyarchies 323). The question that arises, however, is whether and how this dynamic historical 
conception about the evolution of rights relates to his conception of democracy. It is at this point that 
O’Donnell’s theoretical analysis becomes problematic. 
 
O’Donnell endorses a minimalist view of democracy. A country is democratic if it holds regular 
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competitive elections, citizens enjoy freedom of expression, including a free press, and can join 
and create organizations, including political parties (Polyarchies 394). He explicitly rejects a 
broader or substantive view of democracy on the ground that it often leads to or conceals 
populist or authoritarian objectives. Indeed, he attributes the legacy of dictatorship in Latin 
America during the 1960s and 1970s precisely to these unrealistic conceptions about the nature 
of democracy. Thus not surprisingly, elsewhere, he describes his conception of democracy as 
‘realistic (O’Donnell 2001).  
 
How does O’Donnell’s dynamic and historical conception of rights relate to its ‘realistic’ 
conception of democracy?  Since O’Donnell’s conception of democracy closely resembles that of 
Joseph Schumpeter’s, we can assume that this is  a democracy in which the scope of politics is 
limited and hence, political participation is largely confined to the ballot box (Schumpeter 1943: 
269-283). Citizens are not encouraged to make use of political channels to demand social and 
economic change as this would pollute and destabilise the political regime. If this is so, then how can 
the tension that O’Donnell rightly identifies between political equality, on the one hand, and social 
and economic inequality on the other, be resolved? One possible answer is that individuals in their 
capacity as legal subjects (not as citizens) ought to pursue improvements in their social and 
economic status through the deployment of rights in the private sphere – that is, the market. Under 
this conception, the rule of law, acting as a neutral framework that is not committed to substantive 
outcomes, provides the tools (formal rights and a strong judiciary) that enable the political system to 
divert economic and social demands of its citizens away from political channels and into the more 
tranquil framework of private law and the courts. This view about the operation of the rule of law 
complements and reinforces a conception of democracy that severely restricts the scope of political 
participation. Neither Huntington nor Hayek would disagree with it. Huntington would endorse it 
because it responds to his concern about the excesses of political participation (Huntington 1968). 
Hayek would endorse it because he did not believe governments should seek to achieve social 
justice since any such attempt would interfere with efficient market outcomes, lead to an inordinate 
increase of state power and end up by undermining democracy (Hayek 1976).  
 
Given that O’ Donnell regards the struggle over the extension of rights as a dynamic historical 
struggle, it is unlikely that he would endorse the implications resulting from the view that the 
transformation of formal – civil and social – rights can take place solely, or mainly, through the 
courts. But, if the struggle to transform formal rights into substantive rights is acknowledged as 
political, it is difficult to see how it can be reconciled with his formal and procedural conception 
about democracy. The demands for the full extension of civil and social rights to citizens 
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presuppose an increase in political participation and greater public concern for substantive 
equality. As such, it would have a destabilising effect on the political regime and would probably 
soon give way to the populist or authoritarian tendencies that O’Donnell’s restricted view of 
democracy seeks to avoid. Thus, it seems that O’Donnell’s democratic rule of law is not formal, 
but substantive. But this substantive conception of the rule of law cannot be easily contained 
within the framework of a democracy that is procedural and severely restricts the scope of 
politics.  
 
O’Donnell’s reflections on the rule of law are important and stimulating. He is undoubtedly 
right in pointing out that the quality of democracy and its long-term sustainability cannot adequately 
be assessed without taking into account the operation of the legal system. Yet, his claim that new 
democracies can overcome the disintegrating consequences of socio-economic inequalities through 
the rule of law is unpersuasive. Indeed, although law is not merely politics by other means, law is not 
an intermediary level wholly external to the political regime. If the political regime restricts the scope 
of the political agenda – as is the case today in many new democracies in developing countries – 
socio-economic inequalities will persist. They will not be significantly reduced merely through the 
exercise of rights through courts, since courts are not designed to perform this task. Moreover, any 
attempt seriously to seek redistribution policies through courts, apart from futile, would politicise the 
judiciary and distort the process of adjudication, as litigation would become the exercise of politics 
by another means. If, on the other hand, citizens seek the extension of rights through political 
channels they will expand the scope of politics and will require the political regime to abandon its 
claim to neutrality and take the side of those who are economically and marginally deprived. The 
route towards greater socio-economic equality is messy, contested and involves inescapable value 
choices. In any event, whether the extension of rights is pursued through the courts or through 
normal political channels, the political regime cannot be insulated from its consequences. Legal and 
political processes are so closely intertwined that neither can be properly understood without 
understanding the other.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this paper has shown, the obstacles for a fruitful dialogue between RLE practitioners and 
academics are formidable. Yet, these obstacles can be overcome provided that the parties 
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concerned adjust their respective approaches. If RLE practitioners are serious about improving 
economic outcomes and enhancing human rights, they should take into account the political 
factors that have a bearing on their programmes. If lawyers want to make a contribution to the 
RLE, they will have to accept that, although law does not always deliver certainty and 
predictability, it does play a major role in shaping and changing political institutions.  If political 
scientists extend their study of democracy from political regimes into the operation of legal 
systems, they will be in a position to offer valuable information and theoretical insights into the 
difficult process of legal and institutional reform.  
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